

SECRET

16 March 1950

IP - 85: DIVISIONS IN CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

25X1C

Comment on [REDACTED]

25X6□

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2. [REDACTED]

Throughout the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow, there were rumors that Stalinist groups within the CCP were preparing to purge MAO Tse-tung for nationalist deviation, intransigence in negotiations, etc.; D/FR's view was, and is, that MAO himself appears to be one of the leaders of the Stalinist body which controls CCP policy, and that there was, and is, no evidence that the USSR or any groups within the CCP are attempting to get rid of MAO. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This report has no known relation with any other information at hand from any other sources.

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25X1C Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100090002-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T01049A000100090002-6

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Date: 17 Mar 50

Subject: IP-85

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Political analysis of present Icelandic government

Statement of Project: 25X1A

Origin: Internal

Problem: In the light of the recent elections, to ~~formulate~~ analyze the political composition of the Icelandic government

Scope:

It is expected that paper will include a listing of the new government and the political relationships of its members

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum (orig. + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: earliest convenience

Responsible Division: D/No

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

Internal Coordination: None

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

CONFIDENTIAL

Note: The classification of this memorandum must be raised to conform to the classification of the draft it covers.

Date 23 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report

ENCLOSURE: IP-85 "Political analysis of present Icelandic Government"

(3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if required, for formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within CIA:

D/GI	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/In	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/IA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/Tr	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/WE	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/EE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/Ma	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/FE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

Outside CIA:

State (OIR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Army (ID/GSUSA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Navy (ONI)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Air (AID)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

4. Comments:

25X1A

Northern
Division

CONFIDENTIAL

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23 March 1950

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Political analysis of the present Icelandic Government

A coalition Government of Progressives and Conservatives has been formed in Iceland under a Progressive Prime Minister, Steingrímur Steinthorsson. The two parties have a combined representation of 36 seats, a ten vote majority in the 52 member Althing. Less than a week after the new cabinet took office the Althing passed the Government's bill providing for a 42.6 per cent devaluation of the krona and including other specific measures to control inflation. With basic agreement within the Government on economic policy, there are no current issues on which the coalition can be defeated. The more nationalistic Progressives will probably put a damper on Conservative pro-US sentiments but there are no international issues which require immediate attention.

The present cabinet is composed of three Ministers from each of the two parties. The Prime Minister, who has been Speaker of the Joint Althing since the recent election, is a representative of the center, politically neutral, agriculture movement of the Progressive Party. Bjarni Benediktsson, Conservative, who has been Foreign Minister since 1947 is again in that post. Eysteinn Jonsson, leader of the right wing of the Progressive Party, was given the post of Finance Minister. Björn Olafsson, leader of the right wing of the Conservative Party heads the Ministry for Commerce, Aviation, Post and Telegraph, and Education. The Chairman of the Conservative Party, Ólafur Thors, is Minister of Industries while Herman Jonasson, left wing Progressive leader is Minister of Agriculture, Communications Electrical and Ecclesiastical Affairs.

Herman Jonasson was asked to form the new government but he was unable to secure support for a cabinet with himself as Prime Minister, probably because Ólafur Thors, his intense personal rival, refused to accept a subordinate position. These two are apparently willing to cooperate under the present Prime Minister who has been less involved in Party rivalries.

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-2-

An important factor in determining the life of the present government is the willingness of the Icelanders, especially labor, to accept the decreased standard of living which will result from devaluation. Information has not yet been received to indicate what specific concessions were made to labor in the legislation which devalued the crown but there have been earlier indications that labor would be willing to go along with deflationary legislation for at least a sufficient time to permit its effects to become evident.

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CONFIDENTIAL

49815

13 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

25X1A

ATTENTION

:

[REDACTED]

SUBJECT

:

Request for information

1. It is requested that this office be furnished a political analysis of the present Icelandic Government.

2. It is suggested that you call [REDACTED] extension 2708, of this office to arrange a deadline for this material.

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REFERENCE: Case

[REDACTED]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

AD/EE
file

Project: IP-86

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

25X1A

Date: 23 March 1980

To: D/EE

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: USSR dollar balances

Statement of Project:

25X1A

Origin: Internal

Problem: To provide information on USSR dollar balances.

Scope: Requester desires

- (1) Means of acquiring balances
- (2) Amounts and locations
- (3) Trends over past 3 years.

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum (orig + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: 27 Mar 80

Responsible Division: D/EE

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

27 Mar 80

Internal Coordination:

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

CONFIDENTIAL

49930

17 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub,ORE

25X1A

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT :

USSR Dollar Balances

1. It is requested this office be furnished information concerning subject as follows:

a. What are the principal means by which USSR acquires dollar balances?

b. What are the estimated amounts of these balances and where are they located?

c. What is the trend in these balances over the past three years?

2. This information is desired by ²⁷21 March or as soon thereafter as practicable.

25X1A

Reference: Case

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Note: The classification of this memorandum must be raised to conform to the classification of the draft it covers.

Date 30 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report

ENCLOSURE: IP-86, "USSR Dollar Balances"

(3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if required, for formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

None

Within CIA:

D/GI	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/In	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/LA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/Tr	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/EE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/Ma	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/FE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

Outside CIA:

State (OIR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Army (ID/GSUSA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Navy (ONI)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Air (AID)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

None

4. Comments:

None


 Chief

Division

25X1A

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29 March 1950

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM IP-86

25X1A ATTENTION: [REDACTED]
Acting Chief, Intelligence Support

25X1A REFERENCE: Case [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: USSR Sources of Acquisition and Location of Dollar Balances

The following is in response to the specific requirement submitted by the Intelligence Support: "USSR Dollar Balances", 17 March 1950:

1. a. The principal means by which the USSR currently acquires dollar balances are:


- (1) Through imports into the United States of non-essential foodstuffs, furs, tobacco, animal products and manufactured consumers goods of Soviet and satellite origin, and some manganese.
- (2) Through sale of Soviet and resale of Western goods for dollars in Western Europe, particularly in Austria and Western Germany.
- (3) Through resale of rubber and wool to the dollar markets, purchased with the pound sterling earned in UK and Holland, and obtained through black market operations substantially below official rates.
- (4) Through sale of gold and precious stones in the areas where dollars are available.
- (5) Through acquisition of satellite and Chinese dollar balances.
- (6) Through sale of Chinese silver in Hong Kong for US dollars.
- (7) Payments in dollars on trade balances by the Western European nations under trade agreements.
- (8) Through dollar remittances for US diplomatic mission and for benevolent purposes.
- (9) Through US government compensation for postal service to Berlin and Eastern Germany.

1.b. The amount of Soviet dollar balances in the United States currently is about \$11 million [REDACTED]

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29 March 1950



Some of the Soviet depositories outside of the U.S. are believed to be:

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England:	Bank of England and the big 5 banks. Moscow Narodny Bank, London
France:	Banque de France Banque Commerciale de L'Europe du Nord Credit Lyonnais
Germany:	Garantie und Kredit Bank A.G., Berlin Deutsche Notenbank, Berlin
Italy:	Banco di Roma
Belgium:	Banque Nationale Belgique, Brussels Banque de Bruxelles, Brussels
Netherlands:	National Bank of Netherlands Rotterdamse Bank
Sweden:	Sveriges Riksbank
Switzerland:	Union Bank of Switzerland Credit Suisse National Bank of Switzerland Swiss Bank Corporation
Mexico:	Banco Nacional de Mexico
Argentina:	Banco de la Nacion Argentina
Turkey:	Bank for Foreign Trade USSR, Istanbul
China:	Moscow Narodny Bank, Shanghai

No information is available about the balances with the foreign banks, due to the policy of non-disclosure of their customers accounts. It is known that in 1948 USSR transferred from the US \$11 million to UK, \$16 million to Mexico, \$5 million to Finland, and substantial amounts to Holland, Belgium, Norway, Italy and Argentina. Moreover, about \$12 million was transferred to Switzerland, which appears to be the major center of financial operations of the Soviet Government. A similar pattern was evident in 1949.

Bank deposits held by Communists, communist sympathizers, or communist organizations in the US accounts likewise are not identifiable as such in most cases. However, these accounts are available for USSR operations.

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1.e. By the end of 1947 the USSR had increased its dollar deposits to \$74 million and by June 1948 to about \$75 million. However, from June to December 31, 1948 the Soviet Union withdrew from the United States over \$70 million in excess of payments for its imports from the United States. The withdrawal of balances was accelerated from early June 1948. By December 31, 1948, the Soviet bank balances in US were reduced to \$21 million, and were further reduced to the present level in May 1949, although Soviet exports exceeded Soviet imports with the US by about \$30 million. Soviet dollar earnings in the US are being continually transferred out of the US. An average of about \$10 million has been maintained in American banks since May 1949.

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Copy to D/Tr

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Initiation Memorandum

Project: IP-87

Date: 23 March 1950

To: D/Tr

From: Publications Division, Projects Planning

Subject: Siamese air line

25X1A

Statement of Project:

Origin: Internal

Problem: To provide certain requested information regarding Pacific Overseas Airlines Siam, Ltd.

Scope:

Graphics (if any): —

Form: Memorandum (orig. + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: 23 March 1950 at 1630

Responsible Division: D/Tr

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

1700 on 23 March 1950

Internal Coordination: —

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

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22 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub, ORE

25X1A

ATTENTION :

SUBJECT :

Siamese Air Line

1. This office has been advised of the existence of a Siamese Air Line, the exact title of which is not known. It may be one of the following:

- a. Transpacific Airways
- b. Siamese National Airways
- c. National Airways of Siam
→ Pacific overseas airlines (Siam 42)

2. It is requested that the Siamese Air Line in question be properly identified, and that the following information be furnished concerning it:

- a. What is the financial status of the airline? What are its assets and liabilities. Is it financially solvent?
- b. How many planes does it own and how many are flyable?
- c. Who are the officers in the corporation by name and title?
- d. What landing rights in what countries does the line enjoy?
- e. What scheduled flights do they have to various countries?
- f. What is the amount of business the line does per month?
- g. In general, would you say that the airline is a going concern.

3. The

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-2-

3. The above information is urgently required by this office by Thursday, 23 March 1950. It would be appreciated if your capabilities in this matter were determined as early as practicable in order that, if the information is not available in ORE, that an attempt may still be made on Thursday to acquire it from either CAA or CAB.

25X1A

REFERENCE: Case



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Chief, Publications Division, ORE

24 March 1950

Chief, Transportation Division, ORE

IP-87

A report on the single airline specified by the requesting office can only be properly accomplished by including similar data on other Siamese air companies. The attached survey of Siamese airlines, therefore, has been prepared in order to furnish the most complete information available to D/Tr on the above subject.

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SURVEY OF SIAMSE AIRLINES

Pacific Overseas Airlines (Siam) Ltd. (POAS)

Trans Asiatic Airlines (Siam) (TAAS)

Siamese Airways Company (SAC)

Background Information

The consolidation into a single company of the three Thai airlines, POAS, TAAS and SAC has been contemplated for some time, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Plans call for a domestic division for internal routes to be formed from SAC, and an international division to be established by combining POAS and TAAS.

Both POAS and TAAS have been designated by Thailand to operate services between Thailand and the US in accordance with terms of the US-Thailand bilateral air agreement signed 26 February 1947. Applications for foreign air carrier permits for these airlines to engage in scheduled operations have been made to the US CAB where they are now under consideration.

Thailand has signed the following bilateral air agreements which conform to the standard form laid down by the Chicago Convention of 1944:

US	- June 1947
UK	- January 1948
Netherlands	- January 1948
Denmark	- November 1948
Norway	- November 1948
Sweden	- November 1948

Negotiations are in various stages of conclusion with the following countries:

France	- (Drafts exchanged by negotia-
India	- (tion not concluded
Ceylon	- Under negotiation
China	- Agreement of 1947 never actually signed
Philippines	- Protracted negotiations continue

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- 2 -

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Although POAS and TAAS have [REDACTED] reported good profits during the last quarter of 1949, it is probable that, under a Government merger with SAC and with the initiation of scheduled operations over highly competitive international routes, some form of government subsidy will be necessary.

PACIFIC OVERSEAS AIRWAYS, LTD.

Organization, Capitalization and Ownership

POAS was organized early in 1946 as a further development of operations then being conducted in China by Pacific Overseas Airways (POA) of Ontario, California. The establishment of POAS was suggested by Leslie A. Lewis, Vice President of the British William Hunt and Co., who became a stockholder in the new company. The organization was completed in November 1946 and included a stock arrangement whereby 26 percent of the shares were owned by the Government of Thailand, 26 percent by private Thai individuals, 5 percent by Lewis, the remaining 44 percent being represented by the assignment by POA of one C-54 aircraft. A capital reorganization of POAS during the early part of 1949 resulted in the Thai Government purchasing through the Government-owned Siamese Airways, all the stock held by POA and by private Thai interests. At the present time the Government owns 95 percent of the POAS stock and expects to buy out Leslie Lewis who still retains his original 5 percent. Total number of shares issued are 70,000, which are valued at Baht 7,000,000.

List of Directors

Col. Phra Aram Ronachit
Lieut. Gen. Luang Krieng Sakpichit
Luang Sira Jotisara
Air-Vice-Marshal M. R. Sukson Kasemsanta
Group Captain Chansreen Nilpradab
Group Captain Sakol Rasananda

Flight Personnel

POAS employs eleven US citizens including the operations manager, Simon Baldwin; three pilots; one engineer; one radio technician; and five general crewmen. Siamese personnel include three co-pilots, three radio operators and four stewardesses.

- 8 -

Equipment

As of July 1949, POAS had five aircraft in operation including three C-47's, one C-54, and one PBX.

Routes

<u>Scheduled Services with DC-3</u>	<u>Non-scheduled services with DC-3</u>
Bangkok-Manila (once weekly)	Bangkok
Bangkok-Rangoon (once weekly)	Hong Kong
Bangkok-Singapore (twice weekly)	Okinawa
	Guam
	Wake
	Midway
	Honolulu
	Los Angeles

TRANS-ASIATIC AIRLINES (SIAM) LTD.

Organization, Capitalization and Ownership

TAAAS was organized in January 1948. The original TAA was organized by an American, William Davis, in Manila. Because of difficulties between the Philippine Government and Thailand concerning reciprocal landing rights, TAA moved to Thailand and was reorganized as TAAAS.

TAAAS shortly thereafter entered into a charter agreement ^{with} of the Union of Burma Airlines whereby TAAAS, while retaining headquarters in Bangkok, operated services in Burma. This profitable contract is still in force. Future developments for TAAAS depend to some extent on the granting by the US CAB of a foreign air carrier permit which will enable the airline to conduct scheduled operations to Los Angeles. Plans also under consideration include routes from Bangkok to Australia through Indonesia; a round-the-world service through the Middle East to London.

- 4 -

<u>Stockholders</u>	<u>Shares Held</u>
The Siamese Airways Company, Ltd.	1170
Trans-Asiatic Airlines, Inc.	1752
William D. Davis	1
Dallas W. Cederberg	1
Monson W. Shaver	1
Nai Saprunng Debhasadin	1
Air Vice Marshal Proong Prichakart	1
Nai Rak Panyarachun	525
Nai Pohana Sarasin	1048
	<u>4500</u>

It may be noted that the Government of Thailand holds twenty-six percent of the company stock in the name of the Siamese Airways Company, Ltd. Thirty-four percent of the stock is held by Thai nationals. Thirty-nine percent is owned by Trans-Asiatic Airlines, Inc., Manila. Approximately one percent is held by Americans.

List of Directors

Nai Saprunng Debhasadin	- Chairman
Mr. William D. Davis	- President
Nai Rak Panyarachun	- Vice President
Mr. Dallas W. Cederberg	- Vice President
Mr. Douglas Sherman Starr	- Vice President
Air Vice Marshal Proong Prichakart	- Director

Equipment

TAAS is believed to be operating about 6 DC-3 and a PB4 in Burma. Douglas Sherman Starr, Vice President of the airline, recently visited the United States to negotiate the purchase of four DC-4's for external routes. Mr. Starr left New York early in January for Sweden, where he planned to order six Scandia SAAB transports, which will replace the DC-3's.

Routes

No scheduled operations are conducted at present by TAAS outside Burma.

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- 5 -

In October 1949 TAAS flew the following routes in Burma:

Rangoon-Heho
Rangoon-Meiktila
Rangoon-Bassein
Rangoon-Moulmein
Heho-Meiktila
Rangoon-Kyaukpadaung
Kyaukpadaung-Akyab
Rangoon-Lashio
Rangoon-Lanywa
Rangoon-Myaungmya
Rangoon-Aungmye
Akyab-Rangoon

SIAMSE AIRLINES COMPANY (SAC)

Organization, Capitalization and Ownership

SAC, established in February 1947, is wholly Government-owned and directly controlled by the Director General of Transportation. SAC holds the Government interest in both POAS and TAAS. No further details concerning organization and capitalization are immediately available. SAC is said to be in the best financial condition of the three Thai airlines, but it lacks the necessary equipment to operate more than domestic services at this time.

Equipment

As of March 1949, SAC was operating the following equipment:

3 Beechcraft (Bonanza)	- (on internal
1 Beechcraft (C-45)	routes)
2 Consolidated L-5	
5 DC-3	- on external routes
2 Bearwin	

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- 6 -

Routes

In 1948 SAC initiated service from Bangkok to Singapore, Penang, Hong Kong and Saigon. International routes are now principally being flown by POAS and TAAS while SAC operates an internal network as follows:

1. Bangkok-Phitsanuloke-Lampang-Chiangmai
2. Bangkok-Nakorn Rajasima-Ubol-Nakorn Phanom

Direct service from Bangkok to Ubol is operated once weekly.

3. Phitsanuloke-Loei-Udon
4. Chiangmai-Me Hong Sorn-Khun Yuan
5. Phitsanuloke-Tark-Me Sord
6. Bangkok-Singora-Phuket
7. Bangkok-Chandburi-Trad

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: 1P-88

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Proposal Memorandum

Date: 27 Mar 50

To: Publications Division, Projects Planning

From: D/EE

Subject: Forced labor in satellite areas

25X1A

Statement of Project:

Origin: Internal [redacted] para. 1 2.)

Problem: To present a factual description of the forced labor system

Scope: in the Eastern Zone of Germany and other USSR-controlled areas of Europe.

Graphics (if any): -

Form: Memorandum (orig + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: 20 April 1950

Responsible Division: D/EE

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

Internal Coordination: D/WE

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

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22 March 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Pub,ORE

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ATTENTION : [REDACTED]

SUBJECT : Communist Forced Labor System

25X1A

REFERENCE : Case [REDACTED]

1. It is requested that this office be furnished the following information:

a. A factual description of the forced labor system in the Eastern Zone of Germany and other USSR-controlled areas.

b. Discussion of the role of the labor unions in Eastern Zone Germany and other USSR-controlled areas - which have been corrupted into instruments of the totalitarian system helping to exploit labor instead of representing the true interests of the workers as genuine democratic unions.

c. A critical analysis of Communist interference with labor union affairs outside the USSR orbit, notably in the WFTU, the ILO and related Communist activities in Western Europe.

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2. This memorandum confirms conversation between [REDACTED] of this office of 22 March 1950.

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[REDACTED]

S/RE

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Note: The classification of this memorandum must be raised to conform to the classification of the draft it covers.

Date *17 Apr 50*

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report

25X1A

ENCLOSURE:

IP-88 CASE [REDACTED]
FORCED LABOR IN SATELLITE AREAS (3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if required, for formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within CIA:

D/GI	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/In	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/LA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/Tr	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/WE	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/EE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/Ma	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/FE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

Outside CIA:

State (OIR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Army (ID/GSUSA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Navy (ONI)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Air (AID)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

4. Comments:

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for

D/EE
Division

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D/Pub

18 April 1950

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D/EE

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IP 88 Case [REDACTED] Forced Labor in Satellite Areas

Albania

Forced labor is exacted from political opponents and idlers without apparent distinction between those regularly sentenced under the law of August 1947 and those simply drafted for work. These persons are used together with volunteer labor and some "free" labor on drainage projects, highway, rail and port construction, and on the building of military barracks and fortifications. The lack of information, the failure to distinguish among the types of labor used, and the fluctuation in the total number of persons employed on various projects make an estimate of the magnitude of forced labor impossible.

Bulgaria

The People's Militia commits without judicial process criminal and political offenders and idlers to labor concentration camps and labor education communities. Available information concerning labor camps, number of prisoners and activities is presented in the following table.

<u>Camps/Areas</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>	<u>Camp Activities</u>
Buhovo area	2,000	uranium mining
Bogdanov Dol - Pernik	2,000	coal mining
General Nikolaev	2,000	manganese mining
Troyan	2,000	rail construction
Bobov - Dol - Dupnitsa	2,000	coal mining

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<u>Camps/Areas</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>	<u>Camp Activities</u>
Pirin	2,000	coal mining
Resitza	4,000 - 6,000	dam and power station construction
Kutnian	5,000 - 7,000 (unconfirmed report: closed)	coal mining
General Todorovo	7,500	coal mining
Toherno More	3,000	coal mining
Plakalnitza	1,000	coal mining
Kihovo	3,000	coal mining
Kazanlek	(unknown number of prisoners transferred from Kutnian)	—
Dimitrovgrad	10,000	coal mining and (may be excessive) construction

Other camps have been reported at Bosna, Dulevo, Koprinka, Boaz, Rasgrad, Zagrad, Bourgas, Alfatar, Moshino, Bashtina, without additional details as to number or activities. These prisoners are probably used in mines or on public works projects. As many as 75,000 persons have been reported working on irrigation canals in Dobruja. This number seems excessive. It should be noted that the distinction between forced labor, conscripts, volunteers and exiles is not always clearly drawn in available information.

The number of prisoners said to be employed at the various mines is more than double prewar employment in the mining industry, and exceeds estimates of current total employment in mining (approximately 22,000). However, it is likely that from 60 to 80 percent of the workers in some mines can be classed as forced labor.

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SECRET**Czechoslovakia**

In Czechoslovakia, the following may be sentenced to forced labor: Members of national minorities who had been deprived of citizenship, collaborationists, politically unreliable persons, and persons accused of economic abuses. In addition, citizens who are dismissed from employment and who do not find other employment may be assigned to labor camps. This system, which has a rather clear economic basis, is used to expand and control the direction of employment of the labor force. Prisoners work beside free labor in many cases.

<u>Camp/Area</u>	<u>Inmates</u>	<u>Camp Activities</u>
Jachymov	15,000	uranium mining
Kladno	2,000	coal mining Kabel factory Konev plant Poldi plant
Starkov	1,000	{ coal mining and unidentified activities
Nevalky	2,500	
Jiretin(Georgental)	1,000	coal mining
Vyhnanov	1,500	quarries, camp construction near the mines of Brux, Lipkavice and Horni Litvinov
Slavkov	500	coal mining
Marianka	450	coal mining
Elias	550	coal mining
Barbora	350	coal mining
Oslavany	175	coal mining
Hranice	600	n.s.
Vyklice (near Usti nad Labem)	180	n.s.

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<u>Camp/Area</u>	<u>Inmates</u>	<u>Camp Activities</u>
Moravska Ostrava	250	repair shops and Svinov plant
Losany	400	State farms and brick works
Pilsen	60 - 400	Sheda plant

Camps are also reported (although without additional information) at Svatonovice, Pardubice, Cierna, Dvur Kralove, Vseborice near Usti nad Labem, Olbramovice, Moravsky Krumlov, Hrochuv Tynec, Sokolov (Falknov), Praha, Krivan, Vitkovice, Trenice, Kuncice, Wiklitz(Vyklice), Hrusky, Hodonin, Hradisko, Rosice, Borooh, Male Vrbno, Ilava, Komarno, Ceske Budejovice and Vapenny Podol.

It appears that perhaps 20 percent of those employed in Czech mines may be considered forced labor. Clear distinctions of the types of compulsory labor are usually not made. It should be emphasized that conditions in these camps are not comparable for the most part to those in labor camps in the USSR. It is reported that Czech prisoners are to be credited with wages, that their dependents are to receive support, and that holiday leaves are granted. It is by no means certain, however, ^{observed} that these policies are strictly/in practice.

Soviet Zone Germany

Forced labor is reportedly not exacted of the political prisoners in the several internment camps, although they may be assigned to work details around the camps. There is, however, compulsory labor direction for the unemployed and for special projects, such as uranium mining. About 75,000 to 100,000 prisoners are reported to be working in the

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uranium mining area, together with conscripted and freely hired labor. Information available does not always clearly distinguish between forced labor and that conscripted by the labor offices.

Hungary

The convict labor imposed by the courts is to be distinguished from forced labor. It appears to differ little if at all from that applied in Western Europe or the U.S. The labor of those in internment camps apparently has little economic significance.

No details are available concerning the camp at Sopron. Buda Del is reported to contain about 1,900 persons, some of whom are used for rubble clearing, building, and loading and unloading trucks and rail cars. The penal group is apparently not used outside the enclosure. At the Tata bauxite mines 2,000 persons are reported to be in five camps. At Kistarsa, 2,400 persons are reported to be preparing buildings for other prisoners.

Poland

It appears that neither political prisoners nor persons sentenced by ordinary civil or military courts are subjected to forced labor. Persons found guilty of economic abuses, however are sentenced to forced labor.

<u>Camps/Area</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>	<u>Camp Activities</u>
Mielecin	2,500	making concrete slabs, brushes, etc.
Bydgoszcz-Waklo	12,000 - 30,000	farming
Hirschberg-Jelena Gora	5,000	uranium mining
Neisse	2 - 3,000	many lent out to farmers

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<u>Camps/Areas</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>	<u>Camp Activities</u>
Rosental	2 - 3,000	Many lent out to farmers
Patschkau	2 - 3,000	Many lent out to farmers
Schneidemuehl	2 - 3,000	Many lent out to farmers
Rawicz	7,000	n.a., probably in coal mines
Jaworzno	2,500	n.a., probably in coal mines
Myslakowice(Myskowice)	1,500	n.a., probably in coal mines

Additional camps are reported at Oswiecim, Katowice, Warsaw, Sieradz, Milow, Mienasznek(Mienken?), Wronki, Szamotuly, Kalisz, and Lodz, without further details. The lack of additional information makes it difficult to determine either the total number of forced laborers (although estimates run as high as 100,000) or their economic value.

Romania

Some political and non-political prisoners are regularly sentenced to hard labor, which is to be distinguished from forced labor, in that it is apparently equivalent to western penal servitude. Outside the regular penal system, labor is performed by inmates of concentration camps. The prisoners in most prisons and camps are reported to be idle, although some Volksdeutsche were used in coal mines. Some prisoners are probably used in the salt mines. The number of prisoners reported working on the Black Sea Canal ranges from 1,600 to 5,000. The distinction between forced labor and labor conscripts is not always clearly drawn in the information available, making it impossible to estimate the total number of persons involved.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Project: IP-89

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Proposal Memorandum

Date: 27 Mar 50

To: Publications Division, Projects Planning

From: D/EE

Subject: Communist exploitation of labor unions in satellite areas

Statement of Project:

25X1A

Origin: Internal [redacted] para 1. b)

Problem: To analyze the communist exploitation of labor unions in

Scope: Satellite areas in Europe

Graphics (if any):

Form: Memorandum (orig + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: 15 April 1950

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

Responsible Division: D/EE

Internal Coordination: D/WE,

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

Note: The classification of this memorandum must be raised to conform to the classification of the draft it covers.

Date 26 APR 50

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF, PUBLICATIONS DIVISION

SUBJECT: Transmission of Draft Report

ENCLOSURE: IP-89 COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF LABOR UNIONS
IN SATELLITE AREAS (3 copies)

1. Enclosure is forwarded herewith for review and, if required, for formal coordination with the departmental intelligence organizations.

2. This draft report has been coordinated informally with the organizations checked below:

Within CIA:

D/GI	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/NO	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/In	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/LA	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/Tr	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/WE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
D/EE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/Ma	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/FE	<input type="checkbox"/>	D/EC	<input type="checkbox"/>
D/NE	<input type="checkbox"/>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

Outside CIA:

State (OIR)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Army (ID/GSUSA)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Navy (ONI)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Air (AID)	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. Maps and/or Graphics to be included in this report and arrangements completed for their production by the Map Division or the Presentation Staff are as follows:

4. Comments:

25X1A

Chief

D/EE
Division

CONFIDENTIAL

25 April 1950

COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF LABOR UNIONS IN SATELLITE AREAS

Throughout Eastern Europe one of the primary objectives of the Communists after the war was to control the trade unions. Using their customary tactics — infiltration, pseudo-cooperation with the Social Democrats under the slogan of workers' unity, coercion, fraud and terrorism — the Communists gained increasing control of the unions. Their domination was clinched when the Communists forced the merger of all the Satellite Social Democratic and Communist Parties during 1948. Despite early campaign promises to protect the workers and defend their interests, following nationalization of industry, the Communists reneged on the grounds that the workers were now working for themselves and should, therefore, strive to produce more and more. Furthermore, the traditional activities of the trade unions were eliminated and the unions were transformed into organizations intended to harness and control the industrial labor forces in the interests of the Communist regimes.

Organizational changes included: (1) a shift from craft unions to industrial unions, i.e. including all the wage earners in a given industry or plant, from apprentices to managers; (2) extension of the hierarchy of union organs within each national union downward from a central committee through district committees to factory councils; (3) unification of all the national unions into a central committee or council of trade unions at the top; (4) negotiation of collective agreements, on wages and conditions of work, between the national union and the national managerial group for a given industry, within the framework of general terms dictated by the economic planning authorities of the State.

The trade union body closest to the workers is the factory council (variously called works committee or workers' council) which represents the union in contacts

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with higher trade union forums and represents all workers in dealings with management, whether State, cooperative, or private. In addition to the factory council, there are agitators, or stewards, who are charged with enlightening the workers, supervising the implementation of collective wage contracts, conducting organizational work, etc. There is usually one agitator for each 10 to 30 group of workers.

With the reorganization of the unions on the Soviet line, new functions replaced the customary trade union tasks. The new unions organize production competitions, promote Stakhanovite movements, enforce factory laws, take full responsibility for social services, including health and unemployment insurance, build holiday homes, day nurseries, and organize intensive educational and cultural schemes for their members.

With responsibilities and activities thus limited, the trade unions were susceptible to exploitation by the Communists for the purpose of carrying out their political and economic plans. In the economic field the Communists have employed the trade unions as their tool for exacting increased output from the workers. The trade unions have concluded collective agreements the terms of which were essentially dictated by the Government without reference to the workers. Labor has no means of influencing the terms of agreement, being deprived of the right to strike. The trade unions, furthermore, agreed to production norms which were detrimental to the interests of the workers because they generally resulted in lower wages. To increase production further, they organized worker competitions between factories. In the face of increasing worker resentment, the trade unions were required to sponsor the Stakhanovite movement. On special occasions (Stalin's birthday, May day, the 4th of April Liberation Day celebration in Hungary) they promoted all-out production drives including "voluntary" overtime work. If a branch of industry falls behind in production, the trade union, as an ally of the State, exhorts the workers in sessions of criticism and self-criticism.

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Until recently the unions were also charged with insuring the strict observance of labor discipline and collective contracts. This authority, however, is now being taken over by the plant and factory directors, as in the USSR. In Hungary, for example, in January 1950 the trade unions were shorn of their disciplinary power and the directors of the plants were given the responsibility of maintaining discipline: punishing any worker who commits an offense in connection with his work, who deliberately or thoughtlessly causes damage to the property of the States, who abstains from work without reason, who deliberately does his work badly or causes serious damage by negligence, who infringes upon or avoids regulations relating to work hours and wages, who leads a scandalous or immoral life, or whose conduct shows that he is opposed to the order of the People's Democracy or socialism. Thus the trade unions are left with only the right to impose disciplinary sanctions on their own members in connection with trade union activities.

The trade unions are also used for political purposes. The basic political aim of the Communists with regard to trade unions is that of convincing the workers that, in consequence of the Communist seizure of power, the interests of the working class are now identical with those of the Government. The endeavor to impose this line of thinking upon the workers has involved a huge and constantly growing volume of propaganda via all media, together with the training of a large cadre of propaganda activists. To insure the reliability of trade unions, Social Democratic and other non-Communist officers are being replaced by Communists, and even old-line Communists are being replaced by young, well-indoctrinated Party members.

The trade unions are also used as channels for imposing and controlling the political opinion of the industrial labor force, particularly with regard to dividing the Soviet bloc from the rest of the world. Trade unions are also employed to recruit participants for the mass "spontaneous" demonstrations which the Communists use to create the appearance of popular support for their policies.

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Government moves (such as the Mindszenty trial in Hungary). They are also compelled to campaign for the Government ticket at elections and to carry out other political duties.

As an adjunct to the Communist Party, the trade unions are training schools of Communism and are expected to provide candidates, amenable to the Communists, for various electoral posts.

No remnants of traditional trade unionism, no leverage which the workers can exert upon the employer -- the State -- for the purpose of improving the conditions of labor, now exist in the trade unions in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, that the Communist control of the trade union apparatus and labor is still imperfect is evidenced by the fact that the apparatus still functions unsatisfactorily in many areas vital to the overall Communist plan. There have been a few strikes, and trade union functionaries have been criticized by Communist leaders for not attributing as much importance to their work as it deserved. The factory councils have been further criticized for not keeping an eye on and guiding the elected stewards, who were described as their most valuable helpers. The factory councils have shown considerable apathy in expediting the ideological indoctrination campaign. Communist trade union leaders constantly express dissatisfaction with the stubborn remnants of traditional "trade unionism" which pervade the lower echelons of the trade union leadership as well as the rank and file.

In the Soviet zone of Germany the trade unions are being developed into the same sort of economic and political instrument as in the remainder of Eastern Europe. Because the Communists have not yet consolidated their position as extensively in this area as they have in Eastern Europe, East German workers are not subject to the same degree of exploitation as are workers in Eastern Europe. The trade unions are, however, pushing the Hennecke drive (German version of Stakhanovism) and are continually campaigning for the increase and improvement of pro-

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duction. Furthermore, the trade unions have a very important propaganda role in the Soviet efforts to unify Germany.

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Copy to D/EE (1)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

AD/DRE

Project: IP-90

OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

Project Proposal Memorandum

Date: 27 Mar 50

To: Publications Division, Projects Planning

From: ~~D/EE~~ ~~EE/8~~ Non-Soviet

Subject: Communist interference in European labor

Statement of Project:

25X1A

Origin: Internal [redacted] para. 1, c)

Problem: To analyze communist interference with labor union affairs outside USSR orbit in Europe

Scope:

Particular interest is expressed in communist interference with WFTU and other labor organizations which transcend national boundaries in Western Europe and Northern

Graphics (if any): —

Form: Memorandum (orig. + 2)

Draft due in D/Pub: earliest convenience

Dissemination deadline
(if any)

Responsible Division: ~~B/EE~~ EE/8

Internal Coordination: D/WE, D/In, D/No

Departmental Responsibilities: None

Classification to be no higher than: Secret

Recommended Dissemination: Requester only

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~~SECRET~~*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

25X1A TO :

D/Pub,

EE/8,

DATE: 27 April 1950

25X1A FROM :

D/In

SUBJECT: IP-90

25X1A

1. Information relating to IP-90 and fulfilling the terms of the requirement as described [REDACTED] is available in the following published estimates and intelligence reports:

OIR Report #5213, 20 March 1950, Communist Strength in the Trade Unions of Western Europe

OIR Report #4909.1, 1 August 1949, Potentials of World Communism: International Agencies, Part II, "The World Federation of Trade Unions" (13 pp with Biographic Notes)

IN Weekly Summary, 28 June 1949, p.2, "WFTU Reorganization and New Financial Policy"

ORE International Communism Monthly, November 1949, "Communist Labor Control", pp 1-6

IN Weekly Summary, 24 and 31 January 1950, Articles on "Communist Labor Drive in MDAP Ports"

2. In addition to the intelligence information cited above, D/In is preparing for publication during 1950 an ORE which will contain an estimate of the relative strength and resources of the WFTU and the Free Trade Union Confederation (ICFTU) in the current East-West conflict.

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[REDACTED]
Chief, D/In~~SECRET~~

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

TO:

D/Pub

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

File
1P-90

FROM:

D/In

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

25X1A

DATE

TO:

D/Pub -

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

REMARKS:

A copy of this memo has also been
given to

25X1A

FROM:

D/IN - HPT

HPT

BUILDING

ROOM NO.

EXTENSION

FORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946

IP-90

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

2 May 1950

A number of studies on Communist influence upon and interference in European labor have already been published by ORE and OIR. The requester, after having reviewed these documents, has agreed that they are suitable and that the topics covered by them do not have to be re-worked by ORE. Specifically, these papers are:

1. OIR Report #5213, 20 March 1950, Communist Strength in the Trade Unions of Western Europe
2. Sufficient material on Scandinavia is available in ORE 77-49, "Communism in Scandinavia".
3. OIR Report #4909.1, 1 August 1949, Potentials of World Communism: International Agencies, Part II, "The World Federation of Trade Unions" (13 pp with Biographic Notes)
4. IN Weekly Summary, 28 June 1949, p.2, "WFTU Reorganization and New Financial Policy"
5. ORE International Communism Monthly, November 1949, "Communist Labor Control", pp 1-6
6. IN Weekly Summary, 24 and 31 January 1950, Articles on "Communist Labor Drive in EDAP Ports"

In addition to the intelligence information cited above, D/IN is preparing for publication during 1950 an ORE which will contain an estimate of the relative strength and resources of the WFTU and the Free Trade Union Confederation (ICFTU) in the current East-West conflict.

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Not covered in these reports are the United Kingdom [REDACTED]

Consequently, they are processed in the attached IP. Also, France's labor picture, being of singular importance, has been re-examined and is attached herewith.

[REDACTED]

SECRET ORE Committee on International Communism

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I. United Kingdom

1. The overall position of Communists in the British trade unions

Communist influence in the British trade union movement, which has never been very effective, has been weakened severely during the past two years due to the steady and vigorous anti-Communist campaign waged by the Trades Union Congress' General Council, Britain's highest labor echelon, with the aid of Labor Party leaders. The goal of the campaign has been to eliminate Communists from key positions in the trade unions and to educate the rank-and-file of wage earners regarding the aims of the Communist movement. The all-out effort to prevent Communists from holding trade union positions was instigated when the British Communist Party, following the Cominform thesis, denounced Marshall Plan aid and officially announced that it would pressure for higher wages, shorter hours, slowdowns, and strikes; in fact, for the breakdown of every unpopular though vitally necessary measure required by the Government's stringent economic program.

Communist capabilities on the industrial front--apart from individual acts of sabotage--are limited largely to a nuisance value in a few labor organizations; the great majority of unions are impervious to Communist influence. Their principal strength is at the factory bench level, since those few Communists who continue to hold top trade union positions are too closely watched to present any threat. The Communists cannot make trouble on purely political issues; they can rarely create an issue capable of exploitation. They can, however, in certain sectors of industry aggravate existing dissatisfactions with various governmental

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economic policies or labor relations matters which are unpopular with, or misunderstood by, the rank-and-file, and sometimes bring about strikes and slowdowns. The Communists' capabilities along these lines will probably continue to decrease, since Communist prestige and power in the trade unions are continuing to decline.

2. Communist-dominated or Communist-influenced unions

There are a few unions with Communists occupying important positions or sensitive to Communist influence, which because of their position in British industry can interfere somewhat in British affairs.

a. The Dock Workers

Two unions control British dock workers: The Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers Union, which exists only in the London dock area, and the dock group of the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU). The former, a small craft union of some 7,000 men, is Communist led. Although no Communists hold official positions in the dock section of the TGWU, over 20,000 strong on the London docks, there is a Communist element among the workers. Its influence has concentrated in the London Port Workers' Committee, an unofficial group which consists of representatives from both unions. Since the Communist-inspired London Port Workers' Committee is aware that it cannot enlist dockers' support on purely political issues--since the great majority are loyal, if rather easily misled--it seeks to exploit controversial trade union matters. Its ability to do this has been apparent on several occasions. By exploiting the traditional feeling of trade union solidarity, Communists succeeded last summer in persuading with a specious argument, most of the dockers in London and several other ports to participate in a sympathy strike for Canadian seamen who were engaged in an inter-

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and keeping the dockers out, when official union and Government leaders met its first argument, that the Government was forced to declare a "national emergency" and employ troops until the strike ended four weeks later. This was not until the Canadian seamen had reached an agreement. The London dock strike which began on 19 April 1950 was instigated by the same unofficial committee in protest against the expulsion of three dockers and the disciplining of five others by their own union for participation in last summer's strike. Again, the Communists exploited a trade union issue, this time rank-and-file abhorrence for victimization, and the dockers' traditional solidarity, in gaining widespread support of the dockers for the strike. The Government's decision to use troops for unloading has given the strike leaders, as they may have anticipated, a new propaganda tool.

The power of the Port Workers' Committee is believed to reflect, not a large body of Communist sympathizers among the dockers, but the weakness and ineptitude of top TGWU officials and the Minister of Labor in coping with smart Communist tactics.

b. The National Union of Mineworkers

Although the General Secretary of the National Union of Mineworkers is an influential member of the British Communist Party, he is virtually a political prisoner in his position and presents no threat to the vigorous anti-Communist policy of the union.

The Communist-led Scottish and South Wales branches of the NUM are not capable of effecting any change in the national policy of the union solely to further Communist objectives. However, their continued opposition to the Government's wage restraint policy and habitual support

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for all Communist-inspired attacks on official economic policies have caused considerable embarrassment to the NUM; their expressed sympathy for and financial contribution to the Communist-led French miners' strike in 1948 gave proof of their leaders' ability to swing the ranks, the great majority of which are not Communists, behind a Communist policy when it can be masked as an issue of labor solidarity.

c. The Confederation of Engineers and Shipbuilders

The Confederation of Engineers and Shipbuilders, comprising thirty-seven unions, includes three which are Communist-influenced to varying degrees: the Electrical Trade Workers and the Foundry Workers unions are both Communist-led, while the Amalgamated Engineering Union has several Communists on its executive committee. As in other unions, the Communists must have bona-fide trade union matters upon which to attack Government policy since it is impossible to arouse the anti-Communist rank-and-file by militant political issues. Because of the growing dissatisfaction over the wages question, the three unions have been able to press on with a wage claim despite the opposition of most of the other unions in the Confederation which are willing to acquiesce in the wage restraint policy for the time being.

d. Fire Brigades Union

The General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union is a member of the Executive of the Communist Party. There has, however, been no indication of Communist-inspired action by the union.

II. France

France has approximately 13,000,000 workers who are eligible for union membership, yet union members total a bare 4,000,000. Of this number, perhaps 2,500,000 belong to the Confédération Générale

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Le Travail (CGT), which has always been the most powerful union in France and the traditional defender of the workers' economic rights. The CGT is completely dominated by Communists (who occupy practically all of the high level positions), and nearly all of the federation's member unions contain Communists or fellow-travelers.

The CGT's organization and leadership are more dynamic and its financial resources considerably greater than the other federations. Besides the dues of its members, the CGT receives funds from the Communist Party and from Communist unions and organizations outside France in support of political strikes.

This federation is strongest in the heavy industries such as the metal, building, food, railway, mining, and textile industries, and predominates in a great many other industries and professions, especially the strategically important dockers' profession. It is extremely weak in the teaching profession. Regionally, the CGT finds its greatest strength in the Paris area and in the Mediterranean port of Marseille, but in few places is it conspicuously weak.

Despite its present apparent power, the CGT has lost vast numbers of workers since 1946 when it claimed nearly 6,000,000. A major loss in membership occurred in 1947 when the violently anti-Communist leaders of the CGT broke away and carried many workers with them to form the CGT-FO (Force Ouvrière). The FO has consistently opposed the unity of action which the CGT desires with all unions, although some of the FO's local unions have sometimes joined with the CGT in pressuring employers' demands. Most prone to act with the CGT on economic demands has been the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens (CFTC), a union of predominantly Catholic workers. The only other union with a membership

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over 100,000 is the CGC (technicians union), which usually acts independently. The various strengths of nearly all French unions have declined in the past few years, showing that CGT's lost members have not joined other unions.

The CGT wields great influence not only over its own members, but also over most of the non-unionized workers in France as long as its appeals have a predominantly economic basis. It can likewise indirectly influence the other unions by demanding disproportionately high wage increase. Then, if the other unions demand a lesser (and more reasonable) increase, they are subject to charges by their own members of favoring the employers, and so must follow the lead of the CGT, which constantly ties in with wage demands such Communist political themes as opposition to the atom bomb and the war in Vietnam.

The most recent edict of the Communist Party in France commits the CGT and its workers almost entirely to political action and shoves economic grievances into the background. Such political action in the past has tended to cause loss of following for the CGT. But a new method of gaining support of the workers for Communist objectives has made its appearance in the Communist provocation of police violence and subsequent martyrizing of several CGT workers (one of whom was killed) at Brest. Virtually complete unity of action among members of all unions was obtained by the CGT in the sympathy strikes which followed. A return to leadership in the fight to alleviate the hardships of workers can also gain followers for the CGT, a fact which the Communist Party can rely on whenever it feels the need to strengthen its own following and consequently its ability to harm the country.

Following is a list of important union leaders, who are Communists

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or fellow-travelers, [REDACTED]

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COMMUNIST LABOR LEADERS

Albaum - Secretary General, Public Works Union
Garroue - Secretary General, Agricultural Workers Union
Croizat, Ambroise - Secretary General, Metal Workers Union
Bagnat, V. - Secretary General, Miners Union
Frachon, Renoit - Secretary General of CGT
Garcias, Charles - Secretary General, Transport Workers Union
Gruennais, Augustin - Secretary General, Dockers Union
Le Leap, Alain - CGT representative on World Federation of Trade Unions
Pasquier, E. - Secretary General, Gas and Electricity Workers Union
Ranette, Arthur - Deputy, National Assembly
Saillant, Louis - Secretary General of the World Federation of Trade Unions
Tallet, Andre - Secretary, CGT Executive Committee
Tournemaine - Secretary General, Railway Workers Union

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Next 53 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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